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ATHENA, the Hellenic Arms Control Center, is a non-profit, nongovernmental, scientific 
organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control 
policies. It is the only organization in Greece (and probably in the entire Europe) dedicated exclusively to 
research on arms control and nonproliferation issues. The Director of the Center is Dr. Theodore Liolios1 
currently a permanent member of the faculty of the Hellenic Army Academy and Director of its Nuclear 
Physics Laboratory. 
 ATHENA provides policy-makers, the press, and the interested public with authoritative 
information, analysis and commentary on scientific aspects of arms control, arms proposals, negotiations 
and agreements, and all relevant international security issues.  
 ATHENA holds regular press briefings on major arms control developments, providing 
commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in Europe and 
abroad.  
 ATHENA covers numerous peace and security issues affected by proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction including European and international nonproliferation programs, missile defenses, failed 
and post-conflict states and irresponsible defense spending.  
 The non-commercial academic nature of ATHENA ensures that all the proceeds from donations, 
subsidies and advertisements will be used to support the scientific research of the center (in the form of 
fellowships) as well as the education of young scientists (in the form of internships) who wish to 
specialize in arms control and international security subjects.  
 ATHENA’s homepage can also be considered a library, which provides information on various 
arms control topics. Most of that information has been adopted from some hot documents (which are 
readily downloadable from ATHENA’S homepage) and from many other internet scientific references 
 
ATHENA’s main objectives are:  
…to provide the international arms control community with a means of communicating their views 
online 
...to conduct scientific research in the field of arms control and non-proliferation 
…to improve the capabilities of the international intelligence community to respond to new and 
emerging threats, reducing the need to resort to the use of force, while enhancing the effectiveness of 
European military forces when needed. 
…to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the risk of their use both by states 
who possess them and those ones seeking to acquire them.  
…to redirect the Hellenic military forces towards new capabilities aligned with the post-Cold War 
security environment, and to reduce the worldwide incidence of deadly conflict. 
…to provide citizens, decision-makers, scholars, and the press with accurate and timely information on 
nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons and strategies to reduce the dangers they pose. 
…to provide the entire world with a source of information on arms control issues. 
 
For more information on the projects and publication of ATHENA contact: 
 
ΑΤΗΕΝΑ, HELLENIC ARMS CONTROL CENTER 
THOMA XATZIKOY 11, 56122 THESSALONIKI, GREECE 
TEL:+306944165341, FAX:+302310904794  
ARMSCONTROL@ATH.FORTHNET.GR , WWW.ARMSCONTROL.INFO 
  
                                                 
1 www.liolios.info 
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Nowadays, the most important issues that concern Europe and the entire world are 
terrorism, arms control and international security. Lack of education and 
information on the aforementioned subjects can lead to misinterpretation of 
intelligence which in turn can lead to the wrong political decisions.  
 The 9/11 terrorist attack introduced an era of uncertainty fear and awe for the 
civilized world. International terrorism has already attacked many European 
countries underlining the fact that counter-terrorism is not an American issue as is 
often suggested.  Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) combined with the inadequate security measures in the countries which 
possess them enhances the possibility of a destruction of colossal dimensions. It is 
therefore obvious that Europe should actively embark on a campaign against WMD 
which will be precise and prudent where no collateral damage will be acceptable. 
 On the other hand, Europe, instead of passively following the doctrines of the USA, should 
emerge as an independent and powerful force in the new millennium. A unified well coordinated 
European Army should balance the universal influence of the USA. The European Armed Forces 
operating under the aegis of NATO, but without losing their autonomy and independence, could pose as a 
stabilizing and peace-keeping factor for the entire world. 
 Admittedly, the military excellence of the USA is largely due to the scientific excellence of their 
armed forces. It is therefore imperative that the European scientific community mobilizes in order to 
strengthen the European military science while at the same time informing the public and their 
governments about all arms control issues. This urgent necessity gave birth to ATHENA. 
 ATHENA, the Hellenic Arms Control Center, will attempt to challenge the American excellence 
in the field of Arms Control and Non-proliferation. Of course, this is not an easy task and it might be 
some time before ATHENA becomes part of the picture. In the mean time, we are confident that the 
scientific community, both in Europe and its allied states, will respond enthusiastically to our venture and 
become members of ATHENA.  
 ATHENA is a membership-based, non-profit, nongovernmental scientific organization which 
relies on your participation and contribution. All proceeds from contributions, donations, subsidies and 
advertisements will support the fellows, the interns and the activities of the Center. ATHENA’s non-
commercial nature ensures that your contribution will be respected and used for a good cause.  
 Until ATHENA achieves its full potential there will be an incubation period, which calls for your 
lenience and patience.  
 Once ATHENA has become fully functional Europe will be proud of its first and most-ambitious 
Arms Control Center. 
Join us and let’s shape ATHENA together 
. 
With my Best Regards 
Dr. Theodore Liolios 
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Abstract.  
According to numerous press reports, in 2007 at Minot US Air Force Base  six AGM-129 Advanced 
Cruise Missiles mistakenly armed with W80-1 thermonuclear warheads were loaded on a B-52H heavy 
bomber in place of six unarmed AGM-129 missiles that were awaiting transport to Barksdale US Air 
Force Base for disposal. The live nuclear missiles were not reported missing, and stood unsecured and 
unguarded while mounted to the aircraft for a period of 36 hours. The present work investigates the 
radiological hazards associated with a worst-case postulated accident that would disperse the nuclear 
material of the six warheads in large metropolitan cities. Using computer simulations approximate 
estimates are derived for the ensuing cancer mortality and land contamination after the accident. Health, 
decontamination and evacuation costs are also estimated in the framework of the linear risk model.  
The analysis in the appendix of this study indicate that the six W80 nuclear warheads reportedly 
mounted on the six ACMs at the USAF Minot Base could not possibly contain more than 36 kg of 
Weapon-Grade Plutonium (WgPu) (six kg of WgPu each) with a more realistic approximate estimate of 
18 kg WgPu (3kg of WgPu each).  
Regarding inhalation hazards from such a postulated accident, even under the most unfavorable 
weather conditions (absolutely worst-case scenario), the simultaneous explosive dispersion of all the 
WgPu contained in the primary devices of the six thermonuclear warheads (maximum quantity of 36 kg 
WgPu) would generate a radioactive plume that could note pose any serious immediate threat (due to 
inhalation, submersion or ground shine) at distances larger than one kilometer from GZ. However, 
according to such a worst-case scenario, all the people at distances shorter than one kilometer from 
Ground Zero would be at a non-negligible risk of inhaling WgPu aerosols delivering a total dose which 
would increase the individual cancer risk by (at least) an amount of 5% -20%. The health costs per person 
at such distances could amount to (approximately) $1,500, or higher. All populated areas within a radius 
of one kilometer from GZ should be evacuated and the population should undergo medical tests to ensure 
that they have not inhaled any WgPu aerosols. In large metropolitan cities (1,000 people/sq.km) this 
amounts to 3,140 people and a total daily evacuation cost of $314,000. 
However, regarding ground radiological contamination, realistic simulations indicate that there is 
non-zero probability that some areas within a radius of five kilometers from GZ can be so heavily 
contaminated with WgPu that their soil should be scraped, removed and buried in a safe location (e.g the 
Savannah River Site). Such a decontamination procedure, which should invariably be preceded by 
radiation detection procedures, would definitely force the authorities to evacuate the population within at 
least a radius of five kilometer from GZ.  
Therefore, even if the WgPu inhalation hazard cannot extend to such large distances, ground 
contamination should definitely stretch evacuation distances to five kilometer from GZ. At distances 
larger than ten kilometers from GZ, there is a non-zero probability to find contaminated soil which should 
be watered and plowed and crops that should be removed and buried. No agricultural products from such 
areas should reach the market unless they have been screened for radiological contamination. Large scale 
emergency procedures at a metropolitan city (1,000 people per sq.km.) would entail the evacuation of 
citizens living in areas of seventy five square kilometers, that is 75,000 people. A daily total evacuation 
cost of $7,500,000 should be anticipated by the authorities while the decontamination operational costs 
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would be of the order of $75,000,000 (assuming arbitrarily an operational cost of one million per sq.km 
which should be scaled accordingly). 
 
Keywords: nuclear weapons accidents, nuclear weapons, nuclear accidents,  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Almost immediately after the Thule “broken arrow” (US Department of Defense definition of a 
non-nuclear accidental detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon, DOD Directive 1993), the U.S. Air 
Force stopped routinely flying its bombers with nuclear weapons, and standard safety procedures were 
established which required that the warheads should have been removed from the missiles before they 
were attached to a bomber. According to numerous reports from the press (e.g. Starr 2007, Warrick and 
Pincus 2007 etc.) six W-80 (Mod 1) nuclear warheads were reportedly mounted (August 29-30, 2007) on 
six AGM-129 ACM cruise missiles and were mistakenly carried on a B-52H heavy bomber which flew 
from North Dakota to Louisiana. The USA government neither denied nor confirmed the incident which 
is its long standing policy. According to the press, the 2007 United States Air Force Bent Spear incident 
started at Minot Air Force Base in which six AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACM) mistakenly 
armed with W80-12 variable yield nuclear warheads were loaded on a B-52H3 heavy bomber in place of 
six unarmed AGM-129 missiles that were awaiting transport to Barksdale Air Force Base for disposal. 
The live nuclear missiles were not reported missing, and stood unsecured and unguarded while mounted 
to the aircraft for a period of 36 hours.  
 
Picture 1. AGM-129A at the National Museum Of The AirForce (Wikipedia.org) 
 
                                                 
2 The W80 is a small thermonuclear warhead (fusion weapon, or hydrogen bomb) in the nuclear stockpile of the USA with an 
adjustable explosive yield of between 5 and 150 kT TNT. The W80 is physically quite small, the "physics package" itself is 
about the size of a conventional Mk.81 250 lb (113 kg) bomb, 11.8 inches in diameter and 31.4 inches long, and only slightly 
heavier at about 290 lb (132 kg). Armorers have the ability to select the yield of the resulting explosion in-flight, a capability 
sometimes referred to as "dial-a-yield" but more properly Variable yield. At one end of the scale, perhaps using just the 
boosted fission primary, the W80 delivers about 5 kilotons of TNT, at the other it delivers about 150 kt. (wikipedia.org and 
references therein) 
3Air Combat Command's B-52 is a long-range, heavy bomber that can perform a variety of missions. The bomber is capable of 
flying at high subsonic speeds at altitudes up to 50,000 feet (15,166.6 meters). It can carry nuclear or precision guided 
conventional ordnance with worldwide precision navigation capability (USAF B-52 Fact Sheet).   
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The Air Force's account of what really happened was provided by multiple sources who spoke to 
the press on the condition of anonymity because the government's investigation has been classified. 
Regardless of the details of this accident, it is now obvious that security measures in US nuclear weapon 
stewardship may have been breached and the public would like to know what hazards would really have 
been entailed if a nuclear warhead had been involved in an accident in this “Bent Spear” incident. There 
are numerous accident scenarios that might have actually turned this “bent spear”4 incident into a “broken 
arrow”5 one, such as mid-air collisions, accidental ejections of the missile, engine failure of the B-52 etc. 
 
Picture 2. AGM-129A Cruise Missiles Being Secured on a B-52H bomber (Wikipedia.org) 
 
 
In this study we will simulate a nuclear warhead accident and estimate the associated risks focusing in 
particular on the ensuing latent cancer mortality to human beings. Although nuclear weapon technology is 
classified, open literature abounds with relevant data which can yield very reliable estimates of the effects 
of an accident. 
In addition to data from modern computer simulations, our study uses data collected from  actual nuclear 
weapon accidents, and experiments (field tests) simulating nuclear warhead accident.  
 
2. Available data 
 
2.1 Major Accidents 
Although there have been numerous nuclear warhead accidents in all nuclear states throughout history 
there are two major “broken arrow” incidents of which we are aware and in which the chemical high 
explosive (HE) in U.S. nuclear warheads exploded and contaminated an area with plutonium: 
a) In January 1966, over Palomares, Spain, a mid-air collision between a B-52 and its refueling 
aircraft resulted in four bombs from the B-52 being released. The braking parachutes of two bombs failed 
completely and they struck the ground at high speed spreading nuclear material in the vicinity of ground 
zero. Cleanup, weapon-retrieval and health operations cost $80 million while another $20 million dollars 
                                                 
4 “Bent Spear” refers to incidents involving nuclear weapons, warheads, components or vehicles transporting nuclear material 
that are of significant interest but are not of interest to the Major Commands, (Department of Defense and National Command 
Authority, United States Department of Defense directive 5230.16, Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance) 
5 Broken Arrow refers to an accidental event that involves nuclear weapons, warheads or components, but which does not 
create the risk of nuclear war such as accidental or unexplained nuclear detonation., non-nuclear detonation or burning of a 
nuclear weapon, radioactive contamination etc..  
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was spent in reparation and other costs. Of the four hydrogen bombs (Randall 1966) (designated during 
the recovery operations as weapon #1…#4) three were found on land, near the small fishing village of 
Palomares, part of Cuevas del Almanzora municipality, in Almeria, Andalusia (Spain). The fourth, which 
fell into the Mediterranean Sea, was recovered eighty days later. Weapon #2 experienced (Place W, Cobb 
F, and Deffending C 1975) an HE explosion case fragments and approximately 10 pounds of HE were 
found within 300 feet of its crater of about 20-foot diameter and 6 feet in depth. The tail section of #2 
weapon had been displaced some 250 feet by the detonation. Weapon #3 also exploded on impact 
scattering approximately 80 pounds of HE and plastic within 100 feet of its crater. One fragment was 
found approximately 1500 feet from the crater. Radiation detection equipment detected significant alpha 
activity contamination in the area. About 4,600 separate 55 gallon drums of contaminated soil were 
shipped to Savannah River. 
b) In January 1968, near Thule, Greenland, a fire broke out on a B-52. The bomber was 
abandoned and crashed into the ice at high speed and burned; the HE in the four bombs it carried 
exploded, spreading plutonium over the ice (Project “Crested Ice” 1968). About 237,000 cubit feet of 
contaminated ice, snow and crash debris were shipped to Savannah River. Almost immediately after the 
Thule accident, the U.S. Air Force stopped routinely flying its bombers with nuclear weapons. 
 After the Palomares accident the Spanish and the US officials initially accepted the 
recommendation of the AEC (LANL) according to which all areas in which alpha counts per probe area 
are 100,000 cpm (770 μg/m2)6 or above will be removed to a depth of 5-6 cm and buried in an appropriate 
pit which will not permit seepage into the water table. All areas with counts between 100,000 cpm (770 
μg/m2) and 7,000 cpm (54 μg/m2) will have the present crops removed and buried. All areas reading 
between 7,000 cpm (54 μg/m2) and 500 cpm (3.85 μg/m2) will be sprinkled with water to leach and fix 
the activity in the soil to minimize spreading by the wind. However, the Spanish desired much more 
conservative clean-up criteria than those recommended by Dr. W. Langham mainly for psychological 
reasons. According to the final agreement between the Spanish and the USA Government , the 
decontamination procedures that ensued were as follows: 
 
 
Table 1. Decontamination procedures adopted in the Palomares broken arrow event 
Soil Surface Contamination level Decontamination Method  
Above  462 μg/m2 Soil Scraped, removed and buried in a pit 
Between 462 μg/m2  and 5.4 μg/m2 Soil watered, plowed and monitored 
Below 5.4 μg/m2 Soil watered and monitored  
Below 77 μg/m2 Permissible when other methods not applicable 
Vegetation with readings above 400 cpm  (3.08 μg/m2)  Vegetation removed and burned (or buried)  
 
 
2.2 Mitigation tests (Operation Roller Coaster) 
 
Operation Roller Coaster was a field experiment at the Nevada Test Site (Shreve 1965, Stewart 1969). It 
involved the sampling and measurement of nuclear material dispersed by four separate test detonations. 
The detonations were triggered so as to simulate accidental detonation of the high explosives in the 
warheads. The experiment consisted of four separate detonations that simulated accidents involving 
different amounts of high explosives and different storage facilities (earthcovered structures, unbunkered 
buildings, open pads, or transportation vehicles).  
 The four tests were entitled Double Tracks, Clean Slate 1, Clean Slate 2, and Clean Slate 3. 
Double Tracks and Clean Slate 1 were unbunkered tests performed on open pads. Although there was 
some uptake of soil with these tests, fallout was not enhanced to the extent observed in the bunkered tests, 
                                                 
6 Under perfect theoretical conditions of an infinite thin source of weapon grade uranium the correspondence would be 11,250 
cpm and 100μg/m2. Any self shielding in the source or by ecological material would significantly change these figures. The 
correspondence for PAC-1S meters employed at Palomares is 100,000 cpm for a contamination of 770 μg/m2. 
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Clean Slate 2 and 3. Each test was conducted to simulate a storage or transport detonation accident. The 
entire experiment provided data over a range of cloud heights (a function of the amount of high 
explosives, Church H W 1969) and assessed the effect of plutonium-soil attachment (bunkered tests) on 
the fallout of particles near the detonation site. Declassified data from this operation are available and 
used in the Pantex Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) simulations. Other small-scale experiments are 
also cited in a study of plutonium fires (Condit 1993) which indicated that the fraction of plutonium 
converted into a respirable PuO2 aerosol during a fire ranges from less than 0.001 percent to a few 
percent. However, when large quantities of explosives are involved in an explosive plutonium dispersion 
the amount of plutonium converted into PuO2 aerosol is approximately (and can surely exceed) 20% of 
the total quantity involved. Therefore, it is now obvious why the present study doesn’t focus on accidental 
plutonium fires 
 
 
2.3 The Pantex EIS simulations 
 
The Pantex Plant is a nuclear weapons assembly/disassembly facility located 25 km to the east-northeast 
of Amarillo, Texas. A series of reports was published by the staff of the Pantex Plant (Dewart et al 1982, 
Elder et al 1982, McDonell and Dewart 1982, Wenzel 1982) in support of preparation of an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) required by the US government.  
 These reports, inter alia, cover the calculation of atmospheric dispersion and deposition of 
plutonium following postulated nonnuclear detonations of nuclear weapons (Dewart et al 1982). The 
computer code used to perform these calculations is the DIFOUT model (Luna 1969), developed at 
Sandia National Laboratories in conjunction with Operation Roller Coaster. Actually, DIFOUT is a tilting 
plume Gaussian dispersion model (Hanna et al 1982), which includes aerosol depletion through particle 
fallout and the effects on dispersion of wind speed and direction variation with height. The aerosol cloud 
produced by the detonation is divided into several horizontal cylindrical layers, each containing a 
specified amount of the total aerosol of the cloud. The aerosol is dispersed from a vertical line source in 
each layer; the downwind integrated air concentrations and ground deposition are a sum of the 
contributions from the line source in each layer. The calculated values of total airborne dosage and 
deposition dosage adequately approximated or conservatively overestimated (Dewart et al 1982) the 
measured values of Operation Roller Coaster. 
 
3. Simulating “Broken Arrows”  
A “broken arrow” in nuclear weapons terminology is practically a nuclear accident which can also be 
classified as a “dirty bomb” involving the (usually explosive) dispersion of weapon-grade plutonium 
(WgPu) and other materials, radioactive and inert, which could be dispersed along with the WgPu by the 
detonation accident. Apart from WgPu, some nuclear warheads may also contain other toxic materials 
(Elder et al 1982, Fetter 1990) such as uranium, tritium7, beryllium as well as small amounts of fission 
products (notably iodine, strontium, and cesium) from a fission yield not exceeding 172.5 10× fissions per 
warhead (one-point-safe technology, see appendix). Regarding “broken arrows” the hazards associated 
with human exposure to these products are negligible compared to the WgPu radiological ones (Elder et 
al 1982 ) and will not be considered in this study.  
Since the invention of nuclear weapons many theoretical models have been devised which can 
predict and estimate the risk associated with a nuclear weapon accident. In our study we use the results of 
two popular computer codes which have both been used by the US Department of Defense8 namely 
                                                 
7 In a typical modern boosted fission primary, a few grams of deuterium-trimium gas are injected into the center of a hallow 
core of plutonium immediately prior to the detonation of the surrounding chemical explosives. 
8 “Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)”, DoD 3150.8-M, 1999  
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HOTSPOT9, DIFOUT (Dewart et al 1982, Luna 1969, Elder et a 1982) as well as results from a naive 
model (cylinder model) which, despite its simplicity, can yield a fairly satisfactory picture for radiological 
hazards at close distances from Ground Zero (GZ) 
 
3.1 Definition of a worst-case “broken arrow” scenario 
In “broken arrow” radiological accident simulations the decisive parameters that will play a vital role in 
the subsequent health consequences and the degree of contamination are:  
 the type and the quantity of the nuclear material in the warhead(s) 
 the energy of the explosion that will disperse the nuclear material 
 the meteorological conditions at the time of the accident 
 the population density in the vicinity of the accident 
 the degree of warning the population will receive before during and after the accident 
 the quality of the hazard prepardness and the protective actions taken before, during and after the 
accident.    
 
In a hypothetical worst-case “broken arrow” that might have ensued from the recent Minot Base “Bent 
spear” event:  
1) All the ACM would be ejected from the bomber and strike the ground at high speed causing the 
detonation of the high-explosives in the warheads10. The impact would cause a chemical explosion 
in the six bomb(s) (originating from the high explosives in the warheads and the kinetic energy of 
the impact), spreading weapon-grade plutonium11 widely around the point of impact. 
2) all the weapon-grade plutonium in the six nuclear warheads would be explosively dispersed in the 
vicinity12 with no warning13 to the population in the vicinity of ground zero (GZ).  
3) the explosion would be such that a great amount of the WgPu of the warheads would be rendered 
airborne and respirable14. The WgPu in the six warheads can be explosively dispersed due to a 
confined single explosion (e.g. Thule Greenland “broken arrow”) or it can be dispersed during six 
different chemical explosions at an equal number of impact points (e.g. Palomares “broken 
arrow”). 
4) the accident would happen in a densely populated area during the daytime so that the population 
density in the vicinity of the accident would be maximum (e.g. during the rush hour).  
5) the aerosols formed would be so fine that the plume would travel very far away from ground-zero 
without being depleted considerably 
                                                 
9 https://www-gs.llnl.gov/hotspot/index.htm 
10 In an equally worse-case scenario  the B52H bomber would be abandoned and crash into the ground at high speed 
11 Other nuclear material would also contaminate the area around GZ such as uranium isotopes and a few grams of tritium. The 
radiological hazard presented by such isotopes is much smaller than that of weapon-grade plutonium and will not be discussed 
in this study. 
12 Approximately 3 kg of WgPu per W80 Mod-1 warhead would amount to the dispersion of 20 kg of WgPu (see appendix) 
13 If the public has early enough warning it can simply evacuate the area thus avoiding any exposure to the lethal effects of 
accident. Even on a very short notice the public can simply resort to shelters or stay indoors during the plume passage. The 
radioactive plume will simply pass over the city and after some hours the air will be much safer. As regards warning we will 
assume that the public is totally unaware of the accident throughout the plume passage. 
14 Based on experiments and calculations, it has been estimated that 10–100 percent of plutonium contained in the warheads, 
with a best estimate of 20 percent, could be converted by such explosions into a PuO2 aerosol of respirable size (median 
aerodynamic diameter in the range of 5 microns or less) (Supplementary Documentation for an Environmental Impact 
Statement Regarding the Pantex Plant, ibid) 
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6) in the vicinity of the accident there would be a very calm wind15 which would slowly carry the 
plume downwind  
7) there would be an atmospheric stability category which would maximize air concentrations and 
the subsequent doses of course near the receptors height. 
8) there would be a narrow inversion layer16 which would trap the WgPu aerosols and greatly 
increase its concentration between the ground and the top of layer. 
9) the energy of the explosion17 will be just about enough to aerosolize the entire quantity of WgPu. 
The explosion energy, due to the large uncertainties associated with it could be considered a free 
papameter. However, in a worst-case scenario it is reasonable to assume a very small energy 
yield18 since experiments have shown19 that the larger the explosive energy yield the smaller the 
concentrations and the relevant doses resulting from the accident20. 
   
4. HOTSPOT vs DIFOUT simulations 
The Hotspot Health Physics codes were created to provide emergency response personnel and emergency 
planners with a fast, field-portable set of software tools for evaluating incidents involving radioactive 
material. The software is also used for safety-analysis of facilities handling nuclear material. Hotspot 
codes are a first-order approximation of the radiation effects associated with the atmospheric release of 
radioactive materials. Hotspot is a hybrid of the well-established Gaussian plume model, widely used for 
initial emergency assessment or safety-analysis planning. Virtual source terms are used to model the 
initial atmospheric distribution of source material following an explosion, fire, resuspension, or user-input 
geometry. 
 According to the HotSpot notes21, for deposition velocities less than 0.1cm/sec and release points 
at or very near the ground level the maximum air concentration and ground surface deposition is always 
associated with F stability. Moreover, stability class F is usually accompanied by inversions. However, 
                                                 
15 Wind speed is one of the most decisive parameter of a nuclear accdident. In fact if we assume that: (a) all other 
meteorological parameters are constant and (b) the radiological material has a relatively large half-life then the dose received at 
a certain distance downwind from GZ is inversely proportional to wind speed while the area receiving a certain dose is also a 
rapidly decreasing function of speed. Large wind speeds will quickly disperse the material at large distances thus lowering the 
average air concentration of the toxic substances while low wind speeds will have the opposite effect. 
16 We assume a worst-case mixing height of 300 m. 
17 In the Palomares “broken arrow” event the high explosives found in the vicinity of the weapon #2 crater were approximately 
10 pounds, while the high explosives found in the vicinity of weapon #3 crater were approximately 80 pounds (including 
plastics). Therefore, as a plausible first approximation we can assume that the each warhead carried a quantity of at least 80 
pounds of high and plastic explosives. An equally reasonable assumption would be that the WgPu in weapon #2 was dispersed 
with an explosion of at least 70 pounds of HE. High explosives are generally more energetic than TNT explosives (see for 
example J.Petes 1986), thus it is reasonable to assume that during a “broken arrow” incident of a single nuclear warhead an 
explosion of (at least) 70 pounds TNT can possibly occur. (Fetter S and Hippel F V 1990) have also estimated a plausible 
minimum energy yield of 88 pounds TNT equivalent. 
18 Each of the W80 Mod-1 warheads involved in the current postulated broken arrow incident reportedly weigh 132kg 
(wikipedia.org) and were mounted on AGM-129 ACM cruise missiles which according to a relevant USAF Fact Sheet 
(www.af.mil) weighs at least 1500 kg. Ejecting such an ACM from an altitude of 1000 m and ignoring air resistance the impact 
of the missile on the ground would cause an explosion of 3.5 kg TNT. The explosive yield scales linearly with altitude thus ten 
times higher altitudes would cause ten times more energetic explosions. Adding the explosive energy that may be released 
from the fuel and the high explosives in the primary device of the warhead we can obviously assume that an explosive 
dispersion of WgPu can easiliy occur at energies much larger than 10 kg TNT. 
19 Supplementary Documentation for an Environmental Impact Statement Regarding the Pantex Plant, Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, report LA-9445-PNT-D, 1982 
20 This is reasonable as the larger the TNT energy the larger the initial radioactive cloud which means that the WgPu will be 
distributed in a larger volume. 
21 https://www-gs.llnl.gov/hotspot/ 
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unlike stability categories A to D, stability class F rarely occurs during daytime therefore as regards the 
worst-case time for such a “broken arrow” there is a competition between the stability classes: Daytimes 
(i.e. Stability categories A, B) are associated with an increased population density in the streets and 
relatively low concentrations (and doses) while nighttimes (i.e. stability categories D, F) are associated 
with a decreased population density but relatively high concentrations (and doses). We have plotted 
isodose contours for all stability categories A-F under the unfavorable “broken arrow” scenario described 
in figures Fig.1-Fig.4 and have found that for the same population densities stability categories A, B 
result in collective doses which can be five times smaller than those under stability categories D and E. In 
this study stability category F is adopted in all worst-case HOTSPOT scenaria (represented by the solid 
curves in Figs.1-8). 
As we have already mentioned, one of the most reliable studies of nuclear warhead accidents is a series of 
reports (Dewart et al 1982, Elder et al 1982, McDonell and Dewart 1982, Wenzel 1982) documenting 
work performed in support of preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) regarding the 
Department of Energy (DOE) Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. In particular, the report covering the 
calculation of atmospheric dispersion and deposition of plutonium following postulated nonnuclear 
detonations of nuclear weapons is very relevant to our simulations. In the Pantex Plant report, downwind 
total integrated air concentrations and ground deposition values for each postulated accident are derived 
using the DIFOUT model, developed at Sandia National Laboratories in conjunction with Operation 
Roller Coaster (Shreve J D 1965), a field experiment involving sampling and measurements of nuclear 
material dispersed by four detonations. In the same report, the DIFOUT model is described along with the 
detonation cloud sizes, aerosol parameters, and meteorological data used as input data. Finally, a  
 
Fig.1. TEDE50 with respect to distance from GZ (183 lb TNT) 
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Fig.2. TEDE50 with respect to distance from GZ (300 lb TNT) 
 
 
 
Fig.3. TEDE50 with respect to distance from GZ (500 lb TNT) 
 
 Page 14 of 30 
 
Fig.4. TEDE50 with respect to distance from GZ (1000 lb TNT) 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5. Ground surface deposition with respect to distance from GZ (183 lb TNT) 
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Fig.6. Ground surface deposition with respect to distance from GZ (300 lb TNT) 
 
 
 
Fig.7. Ground surface deposition with respect to distance from GZ (500 lb TNT) 
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Fig.8. Ground surface deposition with respect to distance from GZ (1000 lb TNT) 
 
verification study of the DIFOUT model has also been performed by the authors of the report and 
incorporated in the final EIS.  
 In our study we have normalized the DIFOUT results to a quantity of 10 kg of WgPu and have 
juxtaposed them with the results of HOTSPOT under the same conditions (unfavorable and median). The 
results are shown in Fig. 1-8. Four sets of explosive energies of TNT equivalent have been postulated (the 
same as those adopted by the Pantex Plant reports), namely: 183lb TNT (Fig.1,5), 300lb TNT(Fig.2,6), 
500lb TNT(Fig.3,7), 1000lb TNT(Fig.4,8) and for each set of energies we have derived TEDE50 (Fig.1-
Fig.4) and surface contamination (Fig.5-Fig.8) charts. In each figure the dash-dot-dotted and dash-dotted 
curves respresent the DIFOUT model predictions under median and unfavorable weather conditions 
respectively, defined in the Pantex EIS22. 
Dotted and dashed curves represent the HOTSPOT results for similar weather conditions 
respectively, while the solid curves are derived applying a worst-case weather scenario23 to our 
HOTSPOT simulations. All HOTSPOT simulations assume a fairly realistic distribution of respirable and 
non respirable material (i.e. the default HOTSPOT activity distribution assuming the plausible scenario 
where only 20% of the initial WgPu is converted into respirable aerosols with a deposition velocity of 3 
mm/s for the respirable fraction and 80 mm/s for the non-respirable one).   
In Figs 1-4 we estimate and plot the centerline TEDE5024  (logarithmic scale) committed to an 
individual downwind from GZ as a function of distance from GZ  for very unfavorable atmospheric 
                                                 
22 Median weather conditions: wind speed=6.75 m/s, Stability category D. Unfavorable weather conditions: wind speed=4.25 
m/s, Stability category E  
23 Wind velocity (at 10 meters) u=1m/s, Stability Category F (standard terrain), Mixing layer height=300 m, Dry deposition, 
recipient height=1.5 m.  
24 TEDE50 is the sum of all dosed committed to the recipient due to inhalation, submersion and ground shine. TEDE50= 
CEDE50 (inhalation) + EDE (submersion) + EDE (4-days of Ground Shine). TEDE50 is the total effective dose equivalent 
committed to a recipient within 50 years after his/her exposure.  
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conditions (assuming a normal breathing rate25 of 4 3 13.3 10 m s− −× . In the same plots the TEDE50 is 
translated into mass (μg of WgPu, middle left ordinate) and activity (μCi of WgPu, far left ordinate) 
inhaled26 by a recipient (at a normal breathing rate). On the right ordinate the committed TEDE50 is 
translated into the Additional Cancer Risk 50 (ACR50)27, which can vary between a lower (inner right 
ordinate) and upper limit (middle right ordinate)28. Fig.1-4 also yield an approximate estimate of the daily 
evacuation costs (top scale) and the number of people that should be evacuated (bottom scale) according 
to a 360° potential-hazard zone29 that will be adopted by the authorities (see Sec.6 for details). 
Alternatively, the bottom scale can be used to estimate the number of people who stand a non-zero 
probability of receiving a particular TEDE50. These numbers are calculated for a population density of 
1,000 people per sq.km, typical of metropolitan city areas and they are linear functions of the population 
density. For example in areas with ten times larger (smaller) population densities the evacuation costs and 
the number of the evacuees would be ten times larger (smaller). 
Implementing the assumptions analyzed in Sec.6, Figs 1-4 also estimate the minimum health costs per 
person (far right ordinate).  
 
In Figs 5-8 we plot the ground surface contamination (logarithmic scale) as a function of distance from 
GZ for the same scenaria30 described in Fig.1-4. The general notation scheme is the same as in Fig.1-4 
while we also indicate three decontamination zones according to the decontamination procedures adopted 
in the Palomares “broken arrow” event (see table 1). The top scale yields an approximate estimate of the 
costs involved in the decontamination and evacuation operations according to the analysis in Sect.6. 
Moreover, under the same assumptions, Figs, 5-8 estimate the evacuation costs due to ground surface 
contamination and the operational costs entailed in the necessary decontamination procedures. An 
                                                 
25 This is the reference man value for an 8-h workday. For a more elaborate approach age-specific breathing rates might be 
considered (e.g. 1.17×10-4 for a child and 4.444×10-5 for an infant – see Pantex Plant EIS.  ibid) 
26 Actually , TEDE50 includes doses from submersion and ground shine but in the case of WgPu they are negligible. 
 
27 In the framework of the linear risk model the current cancer risk for associated radiation is 0.05 % per rem (ICRP 
Publication 30 ,Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1990). Thus if you received a dose of 10 rem, to the whole body, your risk of dying 
from cancer would increase by 0.5%. Similarly, a dose of 100 rem would increase the risk by 5% while a dose of 300 rem by 
15%. This increase will be called in our study additional cancer risk 50 (ACR50). For perspective a whole body CT delivers 
roughly a CEDE50 of 1 rem to the patient while a chest x-ray exam delivers a dose of 10-20 mrems. 
According to the linear risk model, which is the most conservative one, one cancer death will ensue regardless of whether a 
total dose of 2000 rem is delivered to a single individual or a single dose of 1 rem to a total of 2000 individuals. Thus the 
cancer risk coefficient CRC50 is: 
CRC50 = 1 Cancer / 2000 person-rem 
In the United States, workers are limited to a whole-body dose of 5 rem per year which, amounts to a CEDE50 of 250 rem 
(ACR50=12.5%). It is very natural, therefore, to regard the distance from GZ at which an individual receives a CEDE50 of 
2000 (250) rem as a reasonably critical (safe) distance since it causes to an individual standing there an ACR50 of 100% 
(12.5%) in a period of 50 years after exposure. 
 
28 (Fetter and Von Hippel 1990) assumed 3-12 cancer per mg of WgPu that is inhaled. Our mixture is three year old WgPu (see 
relevant table). Using the Hotspot rem/Ci ratios we conclude that Fetter and Von Hippel actually assume that it takes a 
CEDE50 of approximately 2083 rem to 8333rem to cause one cancer. 
29 Even in the case of a radioactive-material release monitored by a grid of meteorological towers and accurate terrain data, 
evacuation decisions do not typically depend on a predicted plume dogleg to circumvent a community. Rather, the potential 
concentration as a function of distance is considered, and the evacuation is a remote possibility for the targeted community. In 
fact, it is not uncommon to evacuate communities based on a 360° potential-hazard zone, effectively eliminating the wind-
direction variability problem29. This is particularly common at a low wind speeds (for example, <2 m/s) in which wind 
direction is frequently changing 
30 (Fetter and Von Hippel 1990) didn’t use the Gaussian model to derive surface contamination estimates. 
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approximate estimate of the contaminated area (within a 3600 radius from ground zero) is provided at the 
far bottom scale in Figs 5-8. 
 
Instead of the normal breathing rate, more specific breathing rates can used in Figs 1-4 according to the 
following table: 
 
Table 2. Specific breathing rates for humans 
Recepient Activity Breathing rate (m3/s) 
Reference man31 Resting 41.25 10−×  
 Light activity 43.33 10−×  
 Heavy Work 47.1 10−×  
 Heavy Exercise 420.0 10−×  
Adult Averaged over 24 hours 42.5 10−×  
Teenager Averaged over 24 hours 42.5 10−×  
Child Averaged over 24 hours 41.17 10−×  
Infant Averaged over 24 hours 54.44 10−×  
 
From the above table we can observe that the actual TEDE50 given by Figs 1-4 (and the associate cancer 
risk ACR50 and health costs) of the exposed population depends also on their activity during the time 
they are inside the radioactive plume. For example people engaged in heavy work during their contact 
with the cloud will inhale five as much radioactivity as those resting and therefore their cancer probability 
will be five times higher compared to those who were resting during their exposure. These scaling factors 
should be taken into account in all the derived figures and maps of this study, which is a straightforward 
calculation. 
 
All the results of our simulations shown in the available figures Fig.1-Fig. 8 are actually normalized to 10 
kg of WgPu since all the quantities measured on the vertical axes of all figures are linear functions of the 
initial WgPu mass. If the actual WgPu mass is for example ten times smaller (larger) we simply divide 
(multiply) the TEDE50 (and all the relevant quantities on the ordinates of Fig.1-4) and the Ground surface 
densities (and all the relevant quantities in the ordinates of Fig. 5-8) on the vertical axes by ten. Similarly, 
if the age of the WgPu involved is different (e.g. WgPu in warheads to be decommissioned) then we 
should multiply the TEDE50 and the activities with the appropriate scaling factors (see appendix). 
The arrows in Figs. 1-8 indicate the maximum distance from GZ at which one could experience eardrum 
ruptures due to the blast wave from the explosion.  
 
5. The Cylinder Model 
Gaussian dispersion models cannot provide very reliable results at distances very close to the initial 
cloud. We can provide an approximate estimate of the radiological hazards to individuals standing very 
close to the initial cloud by a very simple model.  
Let us assume that an explosion disperses 10 kg of WgPu. (Church H W 1969) gives the following 
empirical relationships for the height, H (meters), and radius, R (meters), of clouds formed by high-
explosive detonations: 
 0.25 0.37592.6 4.7H W m R W m= =  (0.1) 
where W is the explosive yield in kilograms of TNT equivalent.  
                                                 
31 ICRP 1974 
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Fig.9. The cloud-top height (solid curve, left-hand-side ordinate) and the cloud radius 
(dashed curve, right-hand-side ordinate) with respect to the TNT equivalent energy of an 
explosion 
 
Experiments have shown32 that approximately 5% of the radioactivity in the cloud is initially found 
between the ground and T/4, where T is the cloud-top height; 30 percent between T/4 and T/2; 40 percent 
between T/2 and 3T/4; and 25 percent between 3T/4 and T.  
 
Thus, the average concentration of aerosol near the ground, χ (milligrams per cubic meter), is roughly 
 ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
3 2/
0.05 68 31
/ 4
i i ikg kg kg
mg m
lb kg
f M f M f M
R H W W
χ π= = =  (0.2) 
where M is the mass of the penetrator (kilograms) and fi is the fraction converted to respirable aerosol.  
 Now consider a person standing in the open, directly downwind from the center of the cloud (assumed 
to retain its density, shape, and dimensions during its transition, which is a conservative scenario). This 
person would be immersed in the cloud for a maximum time t ≅ 2R/u, where u is the wind speed (meters 
per second). Assuming that the density distribution of the aerosol remains constant33, the maximum total 
amount of aerosol inhaled, I (milligrams), during this time would be  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )3 3 0.625/ /
2 291mg kg
mg smg m m s
kg
Rb fbM
I t b
u uW
χχ= = =  (0.3) 
                                                 
32 Pantex Plant EIS ibid. 
33 This assumption practically means that the person is standing very close to the initial cloud and that the cloud radius is very 
small. 
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where b is the assumed breathing rate ( 4 33.3 10 /m s−⋅ ) for an adult male performing light activity. Higher 
values of W result in lower inhaled doses because the energy release disperses and dilutes the aerosol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.10. The percentage of the radioactivity in the cloud with respect to the TNT 
equivalent energy of an explosion. The first (bottom) shaded area (5%) represents the 
cloud layer between the ground and T/4, the second shaded area above the ground one 
represents the cloud layer between T/4 and T/2 (and so forth, see text) 
 
Figure 11 depicts the TEDE50 (and the related values i.e. activity, mass etc, see previous figures) 
committed to an individual at very close distances after the explosive dispersion of 10 kg WgPu (all 
airborne and respirable) with respect to the TNT equivalent energy (according to the cylinder model). 
Moreover, the radii and the maximum heights of the cloud as a function of the TNT equivalent energy 
yield are shown on the bottom and top scales, respectively. The inhaled quantity of WgPu and the 
associated risk scales linearly with the initial quantity of WgPu dispersed. The far bottom scale indicates 
the cloud of the radius which can be considered the effective distance at which the individual should be 
standing in order to receive the TEDE50 given in the plot. For example the explosive dispersion of 10 kg 
of WgPu dispersed by an explosion of 100 kg TNT equivalent would generate a cloud of an 
(approximate) radius of 28 m. A person standing still at such a distance during the passage of the (rigid) 
cylindrical cloud would run a risk of receiving a TEDE50 larger than 1000 rem , close the threshold limit 
of 2000 rems. 
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Fig.11. The TEDE50 (and the related values) committed to an individual at very close 
distances after the explosive dispersion of 10 kg WgPu (all airborne and respirable) with 
respect to the TNT equivalent energy (according to the cylinder model). 
 
 
6. Health, Decontamination and evacuation costs after a “broken arrow”. 
 
Health Costs.  
 According to the National Cancer Institute34 researchers compiled the treatment costs for 932 
adult cancer patients who were enrolled between Oct. 1, 1998, and December 31, 1999, in trials 
sponsored by the National Cancer Institute (NCI). They then compared these costs with those for 696 
cancer patients who were treated outside of clinical trials. For each patient, treatment costs were 
calculated for a period averaging 2.5 years from the date of the individual’s cancer diagnosis. Included 
were doctor visits, hospital stays, diagnostic tests and procedures, and all drugs given in a doctor’s office, 
hospital outpatient department, or other treatment settings. Patients’ out-of-pocket costs were included as 
well as costs reimbursed by third-party payers. The researchers concluded that treatment costs for trial 
participants were 6.5 percent higher than they would have been if these patients had not enrolled in a trial: 
$35,418 for trial participants and $33,248 for nonparticipants (www.cancer.gov) (Goldman et al 2003.). 
Therefore in the framework of the linear risk model we can make the plausible assumption that the 
average treatment cost per cancer is approximately $34000 (2003 FY dollars). Since we have one cancer 
per 2000 man-rem-8000 man-rem we actually have a treatment cost of $4-$17 (2003 FY dollars) per 
man-rem received by the exposed population.  
 
 
 
Evacuation Costs.  
                                                 
34 www.cancer.gov 
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 In contrast to popular beliefs actual evacuations from disaster areas other than nuclear have been 
carried out consistently in orderly fashion without drills. The motivation of the public to participate in 
drill evacuations appears to be very low. Common sense indicates that evacuation costs can be roughly 
approximated by the sum of the costs incurred for sheltering, food supplies and first aid. An older 
investigation (Fischer-Colbrie, E 1979) of the expected cost and effectiveness of exercise evacuations 
from the vicinity of nuclear power plants led to the following results and conclusions: the estimated total 
cost per person and day varies from $17.34 to $78.20 (1979 FY dollars). Thus the indicative amount of 
100$ per day-person used in this study is obviously a fairly reasonable assumption. 
 
Decontamination and Operational Costs. 
 These are the most formidable costs to evaluate. In this study there has been an inherent 
assumption that the high explosive of the warhead has exploded on the ground. The Palomares and the 
Greenland experience have indicated that Ground Zero can actually be on top of the hills, in the depths of 
the sea or under a thick layer of ice and snow. Operation costs should also take into account the claims 
and demands made by the population in the vicinity of GZ and their government regarding the effects of 
such an accident. In view of the difficulty in devising a model which would provide a reasonable cost per 
contaminated area we have simply treated that cost as a free parameter (one million dollars per square 
kilometer).  
 
 
7. Postulating a Minot Base “Broken Arrow” event: Analysis & Conclusions 
 
7.1 Dose effects 
The analysis in the appendix indicate that the six W80 nuclear warheads reportedly mounted on the six 
ACMs at the USAF Minot Base could not possibly contain more than 36 kg of WgPu (six kg of WgPu 
each) with a more realistic approximate estimate of 18 kg WgPu (3kg of WgPu each). Therefore all the 
results in Figs 1-8 should be scaled appropriately for a relevant postulated “broken arrow”. This can be 
accomplished by multiplying all the readings on the ordinates by 1.8 (realistic estimate of WgPu) or 3.6 
(maximum possible quantity of WgPu), which then in turn modifies the relevant readings on the top and 
bottom scales (costs, areas, number of people, etc.). 
 According to Fig.1-4, even under the most unfavorable weather conditions (absolutely worst-case 
scenario adopted by the HOTSPOT model, i.e. solid curve), the simultaneous explosive dispersion of all 
the WgPu contained in the primary devices of the six thermonuclear warheads (36 kg of WgPu) would 
generate a radioactive plume that could note pose any serious immediate threat (due to inhalation, 
submersion or ground shine) at distances larger than one kilometer from GZ. This result is consistent with 
the estimates of (Fetter S and Hippel F V 1990). However, according to such a worst-case scenario of 
HOTSPOT, all the people at distances shorter than one kilometer from GZ would be at a non-negligible 
risk of inhaling WgPu aerosols delivering a total TEDE50 of (approximately) 360 rem per person (or 
larger), thus increasing the individual cancer risk by (at least) an amount of 5% -20% (minimum and 
maximum values read on the right ordinates). The minimum health costs per person who receives a 
TEDE50 of 360 rem would amount to (approximately) $1,500, or higher. All populated areas within a 
radius of one kilometer from GZ should be evacuated and the population should undergo medical tests to 
ensure that they have not inhaled any WgPu aerosols. In large metropolitan cities (1,000 people/sq.km) 
this amounts to 3,140 people and a total daily evacuation cost of $314,000. 
 Using the more realistic assumption of a total quantity of 18 kg of WgPu the TEDE50 values (and 
all the relevant values on the left and right ordinates) would be approximately doubled but this would not 
alter the general picture since, given accurate input assumptions, the standard deviation of the TEDE50 
dose values as calculated in Hotspot is approximately a factor of 5 (HOTSPOT), while  some authors 
report a factor of 3 (Cember, 1985). Therefore, 68% of the time (i.e., the percentage of observations 
within 1 standard deviation, assuming a Gaussian distribution), the calculated dose values will be within a 
factor of 5. This level of accuracy is more than acceptable for emergency response and planning. 
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  The DIFOUT model predictions are even more optimistic excluding any inhalation hazard under 
any weather conditions at distances larger than one kilometer. Unfortunately, the radiological risk 
estimates derived by the more realistic models of DIFOUT disregard all areas within a radius of one 
kilometer from GZ. However, comparing the HOTSPOT predictions with the available DIFOUT ones we 
observe that the former consistently overestimate the latter so that at some distances the HOTSPOT 
TEDE50 (and all the relevant quantities on the ordinates) may actually be up to an order of magnitude 
larger than the DIFOUT ones. It is therefore reasonable to adopt the HOTSPOT TEDE50 predictions as 
the absolutely worst-case scenaria in our study bearing in mind that the actual TEDE50 (and all the 
relevant quantities on the ordinates) may be up to an order of magnitude smaller. 
 Both HOTSPOT and the cylinder model predict increased cancer risk at distances very close to 
GZ (less than 100 m), where the health effects of the blast will also become apparent (e.g eardrum 
rupture). Adopting the plausible assumption that only 20% of the maximum amount of 36 kg of WgPu 
would become respirable then Figure 11 (cylinder model) approximates the effects of the respirable cloud 
on humans close to GZ. It is obvious that an explosion less energetic than a few hundreds of kilograms of 
TNT equivalent can certainly commit TEDE50 doses (to individuals close to GZ) well above the 
occupational limit. Especially at very short distances (less than 40 m) from GZ, the cylinder model 
predicts that all people run a risk of inhaling lethal doses of WgPu aerosols which could initially cause 
acute health effects and eventually cancer with certainty. 
 Reading Figs 1-4 one might draw a multitude of conclusions about the health risks that would 
have resulted if the Minot Base “Bent Spear” had actually been a worst-case “Broken Arrow”, such as: 
 
a) there is a non-zero probability35 that an individual standing at a distance of 1 km downwind from 
GZ will receive TEDE50 above 250  rem (occupational limit, approximately 12% ACR50) in the 
next 50 years of his life (due to inhalation of the radioactive cloud, submersion in it and ground 
shine). However, the more realistic predictions of DIFOUT indicate a TEDE50 which are at least 
an order of magnitude smaller 
b) it is rather impossible for a person standing at distances downwind from GZ larger than 0.2 km to 
receive a TEDE50 of 2000 rems, which would both cause acute radiation sickness and increase 
the person’s probability of developing cancer in the next 50 years by 100%!  
c) if the authorities do decide to evacuate all people who might receive a TEDE50 of 250 rem 
(occupational limit) in a city with an average population density of 1,000 people/sq.km then such 
an evacuation area should extend to a radius of one kilometer from GZ. Ground contamination 
hazards could extend the evacuation radius even further (see subsection 7.2) 
 
 (Fetter & Von Hippel 1990) have already applied the Gaussian model in warhead accident 
simulations assuming various weather conditions and an explosive energy of 40 kg TNT, which is smaller 
than those adopted in the Pantex EIS and in the present study. They actually simulated the explosive 
release of 10kg of respirable WgPu while in our HOTSPOT simulations only 20% of the 10 kg WgPu is 
assumed to be respirable, which is the default and most probable distribution in WgPu explosion. We 
were able to reproduce their results running HOTSPOT under similar weather conditions thus verifying 
that our results compare well with those of other authors. 
 
 
7.2 Ground Contamination effects 
 
Assuming the simultaneous explosion of the (maximum) amount of 36 kg of WgPu, Fig.5-8 show that 
under the realistic simulations of DIFOUT there is a non-zero probability that some areas within a radius 
of five kilometers from GZ can be so heavily contaminated with WgPu that their soil should be scraped, 
                                                 
35 In fact that probability becomes certainty if the assumed meteorological conditions are true and the wind blows constantly 
and directly towards an individual who never leaves his/her position throughout the entire plume passage. 
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removed and buried in a safe location (e.g the Savannah River Site). Such a decontamination procedure, 
which should invariably be preceded by radiation detection procedures, would definitely force the 
authorities to evacuate the population within at least a radius of five kilometer from GZ. Using the more 
realistic assumption of a total quantity of 18 kg of WgPu the results are almost the same due to the shape 
of the DIFOUT curves (see relevant figures). 
 Therefore, even if the WgPu inhalation hazard cannot extend to such large distances, ground 
contamination should definitely stretch evacuation distances to five kilometer from GZ. At distances 
larger than ten kilometers from GZ, there is a non-zero probability to find contaminated soil which should 
be watered and plowed and crops that should be removed and buried. No agricultural products from such 
areas should reach the market unless they have been screened for radiological contamination. Large scale 
emergency procedures at a metropolitan city (1,000 people per sq.km.) would entail the evacuation of 
citizens living in areas of seventy five square kilometers, that is 75,000 people. A daily total evacuation 
cost of $7,500,000 should be anticipated by the authorities while the decontamination operational costs 
would be of the order of $75,000,000 (assuming arbitrarily an operational cost of one million per sq.km 
which should be scaled accordingly).  
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Appendix 
 
A. Fissile material and weapon model. 
 
A.1 Nuclear Weapons design 
 
Naïve representation of the first implosion fission weapon used in combat (Fat Man). The same physics 
principles (with many improvements of course) are used in the primary device (trigger) of modern 
thermonuclear weapons (www.wikipedia.org). 
 
 
A.1.1. Implosion assembly. In order to assess the effects and the risk of a “broken arrow” it is imperative 
that some general facts about the nuclear weapon involved in the accident are known. Modern 
thermonuclear weapons design is of course classified, however, in a worst-case scenario attempting to 
derive order-of-magnitude estimates of the radiological effects all we need to know is the type and the 
(maximum possible) quantity of the nuclear materials involved in the accident as well as the energy yield 
of the chemical explosion which will disperse the nuclear material in the vicinity of the accident. 
According to the open literature modern thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs) consist of two major 
components: the primary and the secondary device. The primary device, which is the trigger of the fusion 
weapon, is believed to be an implosion-type fission explosive. In an implosion assembly a subcritical 
spherical, or sometimes cylindrical, mass of weapon-grade plutonium is compressed by using specially 
designed lenses of high explosives. Implosion works by initiating the detonation of the explosives on their 
outer surface, so that the detonation wave moves inward. Careful design allows the creation of a smooth, 
symmetrical implosion shock wave. This shock wave is transmitted to the fissionable core and 
compresses it, raising the density to the point of supercriticality. Implosion can be used to compress either 
solid cores of fissionable material, or hollow cores in which the fissionable material forms a shell. The 
“gadget” (the fist plutonium bomb tested in Alamogordo ) as well as in Fat Man dropped on Nagasaki 
were both implosion assembly weapons. An implosion fission weapon may require a source which can 
produce a precisely timed burst of neutrons to initiate the chain reaction in the plutonium core. The type 
of neutron initiator used in early implosion devices utilized the emission of neutrons caused by 
bombardment of Berylium-9 or some other light element by alpha particles. This requires a strong source 
of alpha particles, something of the order of 10 curies  of Polonium-210 or a similarly active alpha emitter 
(Military Critical Technologies DoD 1998). This isotope of polonium has a half life of almost 140 days, 
and a neutron initiator using this material needs to have the polonium replaced frequently. To supply the 
initiation pulse of neutrons at the right time, the polonium and the beryllium need to be kept apart until 
the appropriate moment and then thoroughly and rapidly mixed. Modern thermonuclear warheads do not 
use Po-210. 
 Modern nuclear warheads are one-point safe which means that when the  high explosive lenses of 
the warhead are detonated at any single point, the probability of producing a nuclear yield exceeding 4 
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pounds of TNT equivalent is less than one in a million. Since 2.5×1017 fissions yield an energy of 4 
pounds of TNT a nuclear warhead accident would also produce small amounts of fission products 
(notably iodine, strontium, and cesium) from a fission yield not exceeding 172.5 10× fissions per warhead. 
Organ doses acquired by inhalation of these fission products are negligible fractions (less than 1 ‰) of 
the plutonium dose (Elder et al 1982) and will not be considered in this study 
 
Weapon Grade Plutonium 
 
The fission primary of a modern thermonuclear weapon use weapon grade plutonium.  
The critical mass of a bare sphere36 of weapon grade plutonium is about 16.28 kilograms. Surrounding the 
WgPu sphere with a metallic spherical shell (tamper) to reflect the escaping neutrons back into the fissile 
material the critical mass would be reduced according to the following table (Paxton 1964): 
 
Table 3. Plutonium Criticality   
Plutonium Core37 Reflector (Tamper)38 Critical Mass  
w/o Pu-240 Density 
4.5 15.66 
g/cm3 
4.8 15.36 
g/cm3 
4.9 15.62 
g/cm3 
4.9 15.74 
g/cm3  
Material Shape Thickness  Density 
None - - - 
U(N) Sphere 7.72 in. 19.0 g/cm3 
Be  Sphere 1.45 in 1.83 g/cm3 
Al  Sphere 3.12 in 2.82 g/cm3  
 
16.28 kg 
5.91 kg 
8.39 kg 
11.04 kg  
 
Fat Man (the bomb dropped on Nagasaki) used 6.1 kilograms of plutonium (Serber 1992). Modern 
weapons undoubtedly make more efficient use of plutonium by using reflectors according to table 3. 
Therefore assuming that the fission primary device of a thermonuclear weapon contains 6 kilograms of 
WgPu is definitely consistent with a worst-case scenario although more realiable estimates (Cochran T B 
1998) for a high-tech fission primary device indicate that the Fat Man yield can be achieved by a high-
tech implosion-type fission weapon containing no more than 3 kilograms of WgPu.  
 
All figures have been derived for a mixture of WgPu @ 3 years. If an older mixture is used the mass 
inhaled by a recipient downwind is actually the same, however the TEDE50 is different (and so is the 
associated alpha and total activity inhaled). Thus, for WgPu @ 25 years (typical for warheads before 
decommissioning) the TEDE50 at a particular distance downwind is approximately 10% larger than the 
TEDE50 of WgPu @ 3 years, which means that all the TEDE50 readings of Fig.1 should be increased39 
by 10% when it comes to WgPu @ 25 years.  
                                                 
36 The bare critical mass is not the mass one would need to construct a device since by the use of a neutron reflector (tamper: a 
spherical metallic shell surrounding the fissionable material) the critical mass can be reduced by at least a factor of two. 
37 w/o weight percent  
38 U(N): Natural Uranium,  Be:Berelium, Al:Aluminum 
39 The WgPu default explosion scenario of the HOTSPOT code (S. Homman, private communication) ignores the 10% beta 
component (Pu-241) and uses the total alpha activity (0.081 Ci/g @ 3 years) and the dose conversion for Pu-239. We have 
been able to verify that the default WgPu actually disregards all Pu-241 and assumes that the WgPu consists exclusively of Pu-
239. Such an assumption underestimates the TEDE50 committed by WgPu by (approximately) 10% , which is what you have 
estimated. In the author’s opinion, HOTSPOT users should be warned that the integrated air concentration [(Ci-s)/m3] and 
ground contamination calculated by the default WgPu explosion (under the above assumptions) only includes the alpha activity 
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Table 4. Plutonium data 
One kg of (3-year / 25-year)-old WgPu40 
Isotopes 
 
Half-
Life  
(years) 
Sp. 
Activity  
(α,β) (Ci/g) 
rem/Ci rem/g Mass  
 (g) 
Activity  
 (Ci) 
CEDE50 
(rem) 
Pu-238 87.74 α:17.12 2.88×108 4.93×109 0.391/0.328 6.694/5.615 1.93×109/1.62×109 
Pu-239 24065 α:0.06205 3.08×108 1.91×107 933.32/932.72 57.892/57.892 17.8×109/17.8×109 
Pu-240 6537 α:0.227 3.08×108 6.99×107 59.98/59.84 13.620/13.574 4.19×109/4.19×109 
Pu-241 14.35 β:102.3 4.96×106 5.07×108 5.018/1.734 513.546/176.979 2.54×109/8.79×108 
Pu-242 376300 α:0.003938 2.93×108 1.14×106 0.40/0.40 0.0015/0.0015 4.56×105/4.56×105 
Am-241 432.2 α:3.428 4.44×108 1.52×109 0.78/3.97 2.670/13.609 1.19×109/6.03×109 
        
T O T A L  1000/1000 595/269 27.7×109/30.5×109 
 
3-year-old WgPu 25-year-old WgPu 
2.77×107 rem/g 3.05×107 rem/g 
0.595 Ci/g 0.269 Ci/g 
4.63×107 rem/Ci 1.14×108 rem/Ci 
(WgPu  α-activity)=0.033×(α-activity of Am-241) (WgPu  α-activity)=0.150×(α-activity of Am-241) 
  
Conversion factors41 
(Total activity of WgPu @ 3 years) = 2.22 ×(Total activity of WgPu @ 25 years) 
(TEDE50 of WgPu @ 3 years) = 0.91×(TEDE50 of WgPu @ 25 years) 
 
 
On the other hand Fig.2 depicts total activity ground surface concentrations for a mixture of WgPu @ 3 
years. When it comes to a mixture of WgPu @ 25 years all activity (and mass) concentration should be 
approximately halved (divided by a factor of 2.22). According to HOTSPOT, if D is the calculated 
radiation dose, then 50% of the time the true dose should lie between D/3 and 3D; and 80% of the time 
between D/8 and 8D. Therefore, taking into account the Gaussian model errors we can plausibly assume 
that all figures can be used for WgPu accidents whose age ranges from zero to several decades42.  
 
 
Tritium 
Soon after the design and testing of the first fission weapons it was realized that the extremely high 
temperature attained during a fission explosion can be used to initiate thermonuclear fusion of light 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and disregards the beta activity of Pu-241. Using a realistic mixture of WgPu yields much different (larger) air concentrations 
and ground contamination since it also takes into account the beta activity of Pu-241. 
40 The default WgPu explosion scenario of HOTSPOT makes the following assumption (S.Homann, private communication): 
It ignores the beta activity of Pu-241 and only takes into account the alpha activity of WgPu @ 3 years (0.081Ci/g). Then 
HOTSPOT uses the conversion factors of Pu-239 in calculating the TEDE50.  
41 The CEDE50 dose is (90%) due to the activity of alpha emitters (Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-242, and Am-241) and (10%) 
due to the activity of the beta emitter Pu-241. Pu-241 beta decays into Am-241 thus reducing the total activity of the mixture 
buy simultaneously increasing the total TEDE50 of the mixture (see table). 
42 For example, in the case of WgPu @ 25 years Fig.1 underestimates the relevant TEDE50 by a negligible percentage of 10% 
while Fig.2 overestimates the total activity by 220% (which actually yields more conservative estimates of ground surface 
concentrations)  
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nuclei43. In fact it is well known that the rate of thermonuclear energy production rate is an increasing 
function of density and temperature (Clayton 1984). This fact led weapons designers to vent a small 
amount of deuterium44 and/or tritium into the plutonium pit of an implosion assembly. The temperature 
attained during a fission explosion is larger than that existing in the center of the sun and thus it was 
enough to ignite the thermonuclear fusion of deuterium and/or tritium just as it happens in the hydrogen-
burning zone of ordinary stars45. In a typical modern boosted fission primary, a few grams of deuterium-
trimium gas are injected into the center of a hallow core of plutonium immediately prior to the detonation 
of the surrounding chemical explosives. The fission primary of the W80 Mod-1 thermonuclear warhead is 
reportedly a variable-yield (or dial-a-yield)46 boosted fission weapon. According to open-source 
information the W88 warhead with fresh tritium inside its pit may explode with a yield of 475 kilotons, 
but with no tritium inside the core it might explode with the force of just 20 kilotons. In the same way the 
W80 Mod-1 warhead involved in our study can yield either 7KT or 150 KT of TNT. 
Unlike deuterium which is a non-radioactive isotope, tritium is extremely radioactive and beta 
decays to Helium-3 (mean beta particle energy 5.7 keV; decay energy 18.6 keV). Due to the low energy 
of its beta decay tritium does not pose an external radiation hazard because the charged decay products 
have a very small mean free path in water or a similar shield. However, if tritiated water vapor is inhaled 
or absorbed through the skin it can pose an internal radiation hazard. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe 
that in a broken arrow we could be also facing a tritium release risk. It is also common sense that in 
thermonuclear weapons the primary device is only the trigger and therefore it is not expected to yield 
energies larger than a few tens of kilotons TNT equivalent. Since a few grams of deuterium and/or tritium 
can enhance a primitive Fat Man device by several times we believe that the primary device in a modern 
fission-fusion-fission weapon cannot contain more than five grams of tritium (although a more realistic 
prediction would be of the order of two or three grams-see Bucharin O 2001). 
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